articles francais a droite/deutsche Artikel rechts

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A supporter send me this YouTube video of John Rambo taking out some Asian trash (corrupt Burmese in this case). Enjoy…..

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ya4r2ilycaw

=====BOCHACA ON PSYCHOPATHIC JU-LONDON’S WAR ON GERMANY

THE WAR OF HUNGER

(from his book The Crimes of the ‘Good Guys‘)

Joaquin Bochaca

translated from the Spanish by Margaret Huffstickler

* * *

Until 1939, Britain, owing to its geographical location, enjoyed a unique privilege: it was, of all European nations, the only one that could make war without putting its own existence in jeopardy. Furthermore, by virtue of the positions that it had gradually succeeded in occupying around the world – while remaining, at the same time, totally impregnable to its neighbors and inaccessible to first-rank powers, it was perfectly capable of continuing its commercial activities indefinitely for the duration of the fight.

Moreover, the English ruling elite (which, in fact, still existed in full force despite England’s role as the grande dame of democracy, played for the benefit of an audience of suckers worldwide), knew perfectly well that England was unable to win a war in Europe by herself. England had always needed two fronts: one, maritime, for which she herself took responsibility, and the other continental, which required the assistance of allied powers. From these two principles derives the difference between the English way of thinking about war (that is, during the Pre-Atomic Age, before 1939) and that of other nations. For London, both in 1914-18 and in 1939, the particular situation of France — whose field of action from the North Sea to Switzerland, made it a partner of the second rank, if not merely an auxiliary — required it to bow to the British concept of war. According to this concept, the true mission of the army is to collaborate in the paralysis, the blockade, the asphyxiation of the enemy. The land armies must supplement in their own way the maritime action of economic, political and psychological blockade, by brutally suppressing by any and all means any attempt of the opposing forces to break the siege.

That thankless task England always left to her allies, while she, thanks to her mastery of the seas, continued to expand her commercial activities and accumulate profits — ending up, without firing a single shot, with the overseas markets of her rivals .

Thus understood, war became a kind of coercion conducted using all available means — among which the demoralization of the enemy assumed first place, since in this way it attacked not so much soldiers as their families. England derived its political-military strategy from its geographical location and circumstances. Hausshoffer, the father of Geopolitics, makes constant references to England, and not without reason. Her strategy was based on geographical advantages and her exceptional navy, on her immense industrial and financial possibilities and, last but not least, on the network of political influence that, thanks to the Freemasons, she had woven around the world [418].

Insular and colonial, the British based their reasoning on the dogma of the inviolability of their country, supported by the assumption — quite well-founded — of their omnipotence at sea and in trade and finance. They never lost sight of the World Map. For them Europe was just a small part of that Globe, a large part of whose immediately exploitable resources they controlled — a small part indeed: smaller than Canada or Australia, not to mention India.

Forever, or at least since the fifteenth century, the ruling elites of this so-called “democracy” have looked down their noses at Europe, and still cannot understand how the countries of which Europe has been composed through the ages have had the arrogance to evade their control. Holders of inexhaustible wealth, owners of the crossroads of the world (the Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Port Said, Suez, Socotra, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Singapore, Aden, Cape Town, Belize, the Falklands), living opulently off the substance of immense populations (about seven hundred million),inspiring or imposing their policies in a dozen European nations, they had built these incredible privileges on a strategy that they considered infinitely superior to that of countries which lacked opportunities similar to their own.

That a poor nation without colonies, exclusively continental, like Germany, so obviously inferior in raw materials, is reduced in case of war, to seeking a decision on the battlefield — and a quick decision as well — is something that appears, to those peddlers, as a sign of irremediable weakness. If such a nation intends to conquer, and rise to the first rank. Germany, in this case has no recourse at its disposal but to swiftly defeat England’s continental allies. It might succeed, but England itself, beyond Europe and surrounded by ocean, is protected from any surprise. A great world empire cannot be subject to the expedients of forced solutions. Such an empire avoids risks. Its maritime and commercial activities will never be affected.

England will declare war, but — without wishing to diminish the heroism of British sailors and airmen — the real war will be fought by France. And eventually, (as we have seen when dealing with “crimes against peace”) with France or after France others will fight: Norwegians, Belgians, Dutch, Greeks, Yugoslavs,… “Then,” think the British ruling elite, “others will fight, such as Russia, for example …” Wrong. Big mistake. There is no such “Russia”. What exists is the USSR. And she fights for herself and for World Communism [419].

As for the “poor relation across the ocean,” as Lord Asquith called it — which had ceased to be “poor” and become “nouveau riche“: the classic upstart next to the aristocratic leaders of London — it will also fight, but not for England, nor even for itself, but for the forces that inspire and move its chief executive, Roosevelt. But this they did not know, yet, the politicians in London. Traditionalists to the extreme, they took at face value the lessons of history. Of their history. Their historians are unanimous in acknowledging: war interests England solely as a lucrative business.

Great Britain does not fight except to to confirm her possessions and acquire new ones. Her rise to superpower status was, at its start, the result of a number of private companies, encouraged or sponsored more or less openly by the State … companies which, as nobody across the Channel denies, had a net basis of piracy. It was a matter of carrying out, at gunpoint, business operations of which the dividends were expected to be substantial.

To expel foreign flags from the seas, stripping Portugal, Spain, France and Holland of their overseas possessions was not, to British merchants, anything but a more radical, more efficient way to eliminate competition and to move toward a monopoly of colonial and maritime commerce. The crux of the matter was achieved with the least risk and, above all, at the lowest cost possible. They turned to battle only when it was impossible to obtain better results with intrigue, threat or blackmail.

We must recognize that English rulers and parliaments, ship owners and merchants, privateers, pirates and merchants demonstrated for three centuries, in the search for solutions to these practical problems, if not honesty, at least a unity of views and a constancy to which its homeland owed the ascendancy that it maintained until 1939 and — what is more singular and surprising – its halo even in the eyes of its own victims.

The British ruling elite, until 1939, disregarding any human or divine law which might have opposed its designs, built its entire strategy on an organized isolation of the enemy using the means at its disposal: a giant blockade, diverse, multiform, encompassing, if necessary , the entire Earth. This elite created for itself a simple and arrogant conception of England’s rights as a belligerent, summarized in this proud and immutable sophistry: “We British fight for the defense of civilization against barbarism, and our victory will mean freedom for all peoples; therefore all peoples must help us to achieve it, under penalty of losing their freedom. ”

That tradition of success must necessarily have marked the English rulers, who faced the war in 1939 with the same strategic rules as always. And so, on September 4, 1939, ie, one day after declaring war on the Reich, the British government made public a list of “prohibited goods.” This list, extraordinarily broad, contained a large number of objects intended for use by civilians. The list was distributed by all British ambassadors accredited in foreign countries, without a single exclusion.

Majestically the English government, against all rules of international law, labeled as contraband of war all sorts of food and animal feed, all sorts of clothing, and all raw materials and objects used for production. If we consider that England received from Roosevelt’s [officially “neutral”] America, not only food, but also rifles and even … 50 destroyers (!) the devastating cynicism of this conduct will appear to us in all its crudeness.

In brutal violation of human rights and international law, the English government was able to arbitrarily monitor and seize food and fodder that Europe could not produce in great enough quantities to sustain their populations and, therefore, had to import from overseas. At the same time, the British government claimed that it fought for liberty and against coercion, and expected the world to believe these words, in open contradiction to its actions. And the world believed them! At least a good part of the world did, because, with unparalleled cynicism, the mass media trumpeted that message.

On September 5, 1939, a “Ministry of Economic Warfare” was created in London, whose theoretical bases must, of necessity, have been established long before — that is,long before the outbreak of war, since a ministry cannot be improvised within 48 hours anywhere in the world, let alone in England, a country that has made cautious empiricism and prudence true national virtues.

This kind of “economic warfare” is against the spirit and letter of the Geneva Conventions and The Hague, which clearly envision, among other things, that war will only be fought by soldiers against soldiers, that is, regular armies against regular armies into combat zones. And the British rulers contravened the conventions not only on war, but also on relations with neutral countries. England was convinced that, to deprive the German people of overseas supplies, closer monitoring of all neutral states was needed.

Therefore many neutrals were forced — yielding to all sorts of pressures — to allow British organizations to monitor their trade relations, and to permit a harsh restriction of their internal and external trade by the British. So-called “blacklists” became famous: blacklists of companies suspected of trading with Germany; blacklists of companies on whose board of directors there was a German; blacklists of products that could not be sold, not only to Germany, but to anyone except England … and later the United States and the USSR.

Former US President Herbert Hoover had developed a plan under which the civilian population of the Netherlands, Belgium and France, former allies of England, would be supplied with staple foods (especially meat, wheat and cereals). The former American President declared that he did not want to damage British interests and that it was only to save many millions of Europeans from starvation, especially children, who were suffering the consequences of the war. But the Roosevelt administration rejected this plan with no moral scruples whatever; the U.S. president said he had received a visit from the British ambassador stating that the Empire considered the Hoover Plan harmful to the interests of England.

The Minister of Economic Warfare, Cross, [420], revealed in some articles published in the Times [421] the true purpose of the hunger blockade of the countries occupied by Germany. “The blockade,” he declared coldly, “will be more humane the more complete it is, because the war will be shorter and less blood will be spilled. Germany will be forced to help feed the population of the occupied territories, thus weakening it.” That is, England abandoned coldly, pitilessly, to starvation, its former allies, so that England could retain its position of prominence in the political arena.

To what point Belgium had to go hungry can be deduced, on a purely statistical basis, by the official Belgian data [422] on imports and exports of major food products in Belgium just two years before the war began, in 1937: Wheat: 1,053,000 tons. Barley: 431,000 tons. Corn: 914,000 tons. Sugar: 40,000 mt. Cheese: 23,000 tons.

Germany contributed food aid to the Netherlands, Belgium, France and other occupied countries, but the amount, certainly, was insufficient. It is not possible to calculate the deaths from starvation that occurred in Europe because of the inhuman policy of the English continental blockade, but it is safe to guess that were at least several tens of thousands. It is also incomputable, but certain, the effect that malnutrition must have had on the multiplication of defects and degenerative diseases and the general impoverishment of the health of succeeding generations. Moreover, the extent of the hunger blockade had comparatively little military effect and in any case, disproportionately low when taking into account the resources available to the “Ministry of Economic Warfare.”

Where, on the other hand, the unusual measures of this extraordinary “Ministry” produced positive effects, was in the war against neutrals. For example, between September 3, 1939 and late 1942, the Royal Navy seized on behalf of the Struggle for Freedom, 9,875,000 tons of ships belonging to 24 neutral countries that had risked trying to trade with Germany despite the British ban. [423] Some 1,200 ships — whose goods were seized by England — were made use of by Britain during the war.

Such vessels were returned after the war, except those that had been sunk by the Germans — that is, nearly half of them. This sharp increase in the British merchant fleet, by the random system of modern piracy, was undoubtedly decisive in the war.

Also attributable to the unusual “Ministry of Economic Warfare” were the measures taken against the Republic of Ireland. In early January 1941, upon the refusal of the Irish government to make available to England its ports and coasts for the establishment of British military bases, Churchill ordered Cross (a) Crossman [??] to monitor all Irish imports and exports and to stop sending grain, meat and raw materials to distributors in Ireland, which did not seem to understand that England was fighting for Freedom and Law. These measures led to famine in Ireland and, as a result thereof, a renewed stream of emigration to the United States, which reached its peak in 1942.

President Roosevelt was almost as guilty as Churchill and his government for the extent of hunger across Europe, at least in the period between the outbreak of hostilities and the United States’ entry into the war after the ambush of Pearl Harbor. Clearly Roosevelt, like Lord Halifax — who, shortly after the beginning of the conflict, was appointed British ambassador to Washington — regarded as false humanitarianism the organization of communal kitchens in Belgium and France for 3 million hungry women and children.

* * *

Roosevelt could not have been ignorant of the fact that farmers in the United States, owing to the illegal British blockade policy, had to keep their surplus, and that it would have been extremely nice for them to be able to place in Europe a part of their surplus through relief efforts, even at a low price. Better, confining ourselves to purely economic terms, a low price than to let foodstuffs rot from lack of use.

But Roosevelt wouldn’t hear of it, even when the French Red Cross, through the International Committee of the Red Cross, urged Roosevelt to authorize the purchase of grain at home. On March 8, 1941, President Roosevelt spoke in a radio message, as follows: “The products of agriculture in the United States are sufficient for their own needs and for what America’s friends in other countries need. They can be produced for the democracies — and the others, the non-Democrats can die of hunger.” [424]

It was typical of Roosevelt, as it was of Churchill, to load their guilt on the shoulders of others, shifting the responsibility for the hardships and hunger suffered by the population in the occupied countries, and attributing it to Germany, thus eluding the reproaches and accusations of a suffering humanity; using these sufferings, at the same time, as propaganda, and deception, while at the same time deceiving the American people about the real situation. But neither in form nor in substance can there exist the slightest doubt that to the English and American governments belongs all the responsibility for the inhuman war of starvation against millions of Europeans — even if the sounding boards of the mass media could dodge this indisputable fact.

To conclude this topic, let us examine it from a legal standpoint, ie the laws in force in international law during the time at hand: Germany, according to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, is required only to restore and maintain public order and safeguard the lives of citizens in the occupied territories, but not to feed the population with its own reserves. Moreover, under Article 52 of the same Regulations, the German army of occupation would be entitled to claim for themselves, in proper proportion to its numbers, some of the provisions of the country. Nevertheless, the German troops, at least until 1942, were fed with food brought from Germany.

It should also be taken into account that the English, French and Belgian armies, in fleeing, destroyed numerous stores of food… France, Belgium and Holland, meanwhile, were countries accustomed to cover their deficit of food by way of the sea. Trusting in England, the Queen of the Seas, they had stopped trying to make their economies autarkic, and paid for their trust with hunger, deprivation and misery.

A single example among dozens that could be cited: In January 1941 the French merchant “Mendoza”, with a cargo of drugs that the Vichy Government had bought in Argentina and destined for the population of unoccupied France, tried to cross the Atlantic Ocean from South America.

First it was detained by an English auxiliary ship, within Uruguayan waters, but was allowed continue the journey. However, two days later, five and a half miles off the Brazilian coast — ie within the Pan-American security zone — it was captured, and the British seized the ship and cargo. The British knew very well that the “Mendoza” was carrying food and, especially, medicines for women and children in the unoccupied zone. They knew about the allocation, having been given full assurances from the American Red Cross. [425].

=============HUMOR

[source: http://www.borowitzreport.com/2010/04/25/somali-pirates-say-they-are-subsidiary-of-goldman-sachs/ [Borowitz is a juish comedian who often is pretty funny.]

* * *

Somali Pirates Say They Are Subsidiary of Goldman Sachs

Could Make Prosecution Difficult, Experts Say

NORFOLK, VIRGINIA (The Borowitz Report

) – Eleven indicted Somali pirates dropped a bombshell in a U.S. court today, revealing that their entire piracy operation is a subsidiary of banking giant Goldman Sachs.

There was an audible gasp in the courtroom when the leader of the pirates announced, “We are doing God’s work.  We work for Lloyd Blankfein.”

The pirate, who said he earned a bonus of $48 million in dubloons last year, elaborated on the nature of the Somalis’ work for Goldman, explaining that the pirates forcibly attacked ships that Goldman had already shorted.

“We were functioning as investment bankers, only every day was casual Friday,” the pirate said.

The pirate acknowledged that they merged their operations with Goldman in late 2008 to take advantage of the more relaxed regulations governing bankers as opposed to pirates, “plus to get our share of the bailout money.”

In the aftermath of the shocking revelations, government prosecutors were scrambling to see if they still had a case against the Somali pirates, who would now be treated as bankers in the eyes of the law.

“There are lots of laws that could bring these guys down if they were, in fact, pirates,” one government source said.  “But if they’re bankers, our hands are tied.”