Hitler’s “remilitarization” of the Rhineland — AFTER France had allied itself militarily with the Bolsheviks against Germany; Hitler’s interview suppressed

Hitler, Goebbels and Goering

HITLER’S REMILITARIZATION OF THE RHINELAND

 

Translated from “The Crimes of the Good Guys” of author Joaquin Bochaca

by Margaret Huffstickler (so gorgeous before her cancer — John)

The [1935] Franco-Soviet Pact had instituted a situation of hostility between France and the Third Reich. After all, a basic tenet of Hitler’s policy was his idea of ​​the Drang nach Osten, the March to the East–a natural tendency of the German people since the Knights of the Teutonic Order, and even since Charlemagne. It is difficult to see how such a policy could be carried out without resorting to war, unless one were to bring about the downfall of the USSR by isolating it politically, militarily and economically, while at the same time supporting the Ukrainian irredentist movements. This policy was that originally followed by Hitler, who dreamed of vast territories to settle, with Ukrainians and Byelorussians under German tutelage. The immense spaces of Eastern Europe would thus remain open to Germany’s colonial expansion.

Already in Mein Kampf Hitler had announced his intentions in this regard; the Bolshevik colossus was a giant with feet of clay that kept itself in power only through police-state terror aided by oriental fatalism. But there was a possibility that the political isolation of the USSR and support for Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalism previsioned by Hitler would not be sufficient to bring about the downfall of the colossus, and that the day would come when it would be necessary to confront it militarily. That is why Hitler desired peace—real peace, and not merely an armed peace—with the West, for which he asked nothing in return. In case of an armed intervention in the East, Hitler needed a free hand—that is, not to find himself forced to make war on two fronts.

Toward this end the Locarno Pact was signed, by which England and Italy agreed to leave Germany a free hand, as did France, although France’s less-than transparent politics and its flirtations with the Little Entente darkened the picture a little, which otherwise seemed very bright for the Reich.

Against this policy the Franco-Soviet Pact loomed up as an obstacle that, together with the Czecho-Soviet pact which complemented it, installed Bolshevism politically in Central Europe, and moreover made it impossible for Hitler to prevent its expansion throughout all Europe except by recourse to a war on two fronts. The French diplomatic measure not only established Communism in the heart of Europe and built a bridge to the West through the former’s alliance with the Little Entente, but at the same time granted it a patent of respectability it had heretofore lacked. It is logical then, that Stalin welcomed the Pact as a blessing, and in return ordered the French Communists to stop the strikes and demonstrations that had been causing so much harm to the French economy.

Here is the position adopted by the Reich in response to the real diplomatic aggression represented by the Franco-Soviet Pact:

A) By committing herself to intervene in favor of the USSR even if the League of Nations made no such recommendation, France was making an agreement that far surpassed its obligations with regard to the articles of the League of Nations, since France literally “reserved to herself the right to determine who the aggressor was,” which, from a political perspective, is a monstrosity.

B) By the [1925] Treaty of Locarno, France had promised not to carry out military operations against Germany except in a case of legitimate defense or if Poland or Czechoslovakia, with whom France had pacts of mutual assistance, were attacked by the Reich. Except for these specific cases, France renounced all recourse to war with respect to Germany, in exchange for a similar promise by Germany and the creation of a demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, on the left bank of the Rhine.

C) Apart from the circumstances specified in the Locarno Pact, the Franco-Soviet Pact introduced into International Law, and by the exclusive will of two of its members, France and the USSR–that is, by a tiny minority–a third case, in which Germany would find itself in conflict with the Soviet Union. It specified that in this case France reserved the right to decide that Germany was the aggressor and that she had, not merely the right, but the duty to intervene by attacking Germany.

Some analysts, with unintentional humor, have claimed that the Franco-Soviet Pact was not directed against Germany. [22] If the Pact was not directed against Germany, against whom, then, was it directed? For there can be no reasonable doubt: a pact of military aid necessarily has to be, by definition, directed against someone. It could not, certainly, have been against Poland, allied by pacts with the USSR and, since its restoration as an independent nation in 1919, with France. Neither could it be against Czechoslovakia, which had just signed a pact of mutual aid with Stalin. Nor against Rumania, which, like Yugoslavia, a member of the Little Entente, had a military pact with France. . . Unless we are to believe that France promised its aid to the Soviet Union in case it was attacked by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Finland ;-), there remains, physically, no other possibility than an armed confrontation with Germany.

It is ridiculous, then, to deny that the Franco-Soviet Pact was aimed at the Reich. Consequently, on the 25^th of May the German government sent a note to that of France, setting out this position: “Any intervention by France in consequence of the Franco-Soviet Pact would be contrary to Article 16 of the Pact of the League of Nations and would mean a violation of the Treaty of Locarno.” Hitler mentioned Article 16 of the Pact of the League of Nations only incidentally. What he emphasized was the violation of the Treaty of Locarno, which he had described as “the only really clear and honorable treaty that exists in Europe.” [23]

France took no less than a month to answer the German memorandum. On June 25, 1935 the French reply had the audacity to affirm that “The Franco-Soviet Pact is not a military commitment.” The French response does not stand up to the most cursory examination; the text of the Pact says, expressly: “In the event that France or the USSR becomes the object of unprovoked aggression by a European nation, the USSR and reciprocally France will lend immediate aid and assistance.”

And, we repeat, the signatories were to be the sole judges to determine who the aggressor was, independent of what the League of Nations, to which they both belonged, might have to say on the subject. [French PM Léon Blum [a jew] did more. He wanted to obtain the moral support of the co-signatories of the Treaty of Locarno, and asked all of them the same question: “Do you consider that the Franco-Soviet Pact contains military implications?” London, Rome and Brussels asked for clarification of the question. Paris formulated it in other terms: “Do you believe that the Franco-Soviet Pact is in opposition to the Pact of Locarno?

After having been asked repeatedly, London responded on July 5. “The signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact does not modify in the least the obligations contracted by Great Britain” . . . but it did not give its approval. Very English. As if it had been agreed upon, Rome and Brussels replied in the same vein. This hardened Germany’s position even more, and when it was announced on January 7, 1936 that the discussion on the ratification of the Pact in the French Parliament would take place on February 12, Hitler let it be known to the French Government, through his ambassador in Paris, that the Reich “would consider the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact by the French Parliament as a hostile act toward Germany, and incompatible with the obligations of the Pact of Locarno, whose spirit and letter France would have violated.”

The debate over the ratification lasted 15 days. The well-known journalist Bertrand de Jouvenal, from the magazine Paris-Midi, succeeded in obtaining an interview with Hitler on February 21, in the middle of the debate. Jouvenal questioned Hitler about his sincerity when he claimed that he sought friendship with France, given that there were two or three very harsh diatribes against the French in Mein Kampf. Hitler answered:

I was under pressure when I wrote this book. French troops were occupying the Ruhr. It was a moment of maximum tension between our two countries. Yes, we were enemies. And I, of course, was on the side of my country, against yours, just as I was on the side of my country against yours for four years in the trenches. I wouldn’t have respected myself if I had not been, above all, German, when the war came.

But now there is no reason at all for conflict between our two countries. What do you want? For me to make corrections in my book like an author who prepares a new edition of his works? I am not a writer; I am a politician. My revisions? I make them every day in my foreign policy, constantly seeking friendship with France. My revisions I write in the great book of History.”

Jouvenal then posed another question: “You would like a Franco-German rapprochement. Won’t the Franco-Soviet Pact endanger that?” Hitler’s answer: “My personal efforts toward a reconciliation will continue always. Nevertheless, in practical terms, this unfortunate Pact will of course create a new situation.” Hitler stressed the point, saying:

You are allowing yourselves to be dragged into the diplomatic game of a power that desires nothing more than to create chaos in the great European nations; a chaos of which she would be the greatest beneficiary.

 

One must not lose sight of the fact that Soviet Russia is a political element which has at its disposition an explosive revolutionary force and gigantic armaments. As a German I must take note of such a situation. Bolshevism has no chance at all of success in Germany. But there are other great nations that are less immunized than we are against the Bolshevik virus. . .

You would do well to reflect seriously on my offers of an accord. I propose to you what no other German government could have proposed to you: an accord that would be approved by 90 percent of the German nation, the ninety percent who support me. I earnestly request you to take this into account: there are in the lives of nations, decisive occasions.

Today France can, if she wants, end forever the German danger that your sons have learned, from generation to generation, to fear. You could in one stroke, remove this lien that weighs heavily on the history of France.

You have this chance. If you do not take it, think of the responsibility you hold towards your children. You have before you a Germany, nine tenths of whom have confidence in their leader, and this leader says to you:

Let us be friends! [24]

These were very skilled words and, apparently at least, sincere, given Hitler’s foreign policy up to that point. These declarations had the possibility of modifying the decision of the French Parliament. And if the Parliament did not ratify the Franco-Soviet Pact, it would remain without effect, the Popular Front government would fall, and the USSR would receive a veritable diplomatic slap in the face. Nevertheless, Jouvenal’s interview with Hitler was not published until seven days after it took place, that is, February 28, exactly one day after the ratification vote in Parliament.

The interview appeared too late, to the great surprise of the French and the indignation of Hitler, who was put in a position of seeming ineffectual, as if he had surrendered to the vote, which was favorable to the ratification of the Pact by 353 in favor and 164 against. The speeches given in Parliament by the radical leader Edouard Herriot [photo r.], quoting repeatedly the anti-French phrases in Mein Kampf, were decisive in swaying the hundred center-right deputies to the side of the ratification of the Pact.

How was it possible that statements of such sensational importance were concealed from the public for seven days? Two versions have been given. According to Galtier-Boissière, there was an intervention by the government, which pressured the publishers of Paris-Midi not to publish Hitler’s declarations until after the vote. [25]

It is most probable that that was the case, since Hitler’s offers and his explanations of the notorious anti-French passages in Mein Kampf would certainly have had an impact on public opinion and on the hundred right-wingers. With towering impudence, Herriot had declared to his colleagues: “Don’t you think that if Hitler wasn’t sincere in his feelings against France, he would have refuted those passages in his book, or at least given us some explanation regarding them?”

The fact is that this “explanation” which Herriot demanded had been given by Hitler days before and that, according to Galtier-Boissiere and others, [26] the French government knew that, and kept it from the public. And if the French government did not know about it, then the responsibility would fall on the publishers of Paris-Midi. But when the maneuver was discovered in Germany there were protests that could not possibly have passed unnoticed by the French Government, which, nevertheless, took no measures against the magazine for its flagrant manipulation of information.

In any case, the French war party, with the Front Populaire and a large part of the right-wing nationalists, had managed to put together the same strategy that had previously culminated in the Franco-Russian pact of 1891, which almost set off a war in 1907 and again in 1911, finally succeeding in 1914. The French government, and the majority of the parliamentarians who ratified the Pact, however, were ignorant–or appeared to be ignorant–of the fact that Tsarist Russia and Bolshevik Russian were two very different realities.

Hitler’s answer came a week later. On March 7, 1936 Hitler ordered the remilitarization of the Rhineland [that is, German trooops were once again stationed in this part of Germany that bordered France, Belgium and Holland], officially informing the countries who were cosignatories of the Locarno Treaty, Belgium, France, England and Italy, that France having violated said Treaty, whose obligations were incompatible with the new Franco-Soviet Pact, he considered himself released from the Treaty.

The remilitarization of the left bank of the Rhine was indubitably a violation of the dispositions of Part V of the Versailles Treaty, as well as the Treaty of Locarno. But it was no more than a response to a previous violation of these two treaties by France. In International Law—as for that matter in Civil Law—a treaty is no more than a reciprocal promise among two or more parties to carry out certain obligations. When one of the parties fails in its obligations, the other or the others are automatically released from theirs.

France’s reaction to the remilitarization of the Rhineland was very animated, both diplomatically and in the realm of public opinion. But Germany held firm. Hitler knew from the English note of July 5, 1935 and the Italian of July 15, responding to the inquiries by France over the — then — projected Franco-Soviet Pact, that none of these powers would intervene, and hence France would remain alone against Germany. When France now turned to Poland and the Little Entente, she received in response the promise of aid from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Poland, but only on condition that France would take the initiative and that England and Italy would be part of the coalition. That is, in diplomatic language, her allies left France on her own.

On March 12, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the co-signatories of the Treaty of Locarno met in London. Hitler set, as a condition for sending a representative: that the latter would have the same right to speak as his colleagues, that the previous violation of the terms of the Treaty by France would be studied and that the delegates would be prepared to immediately enter into negotiations over new German proposals.

When these requests were refused by France and Belgium—which, at that time, was politically a satellite of France—Germany refrained from sending a representative to the London conference. At the conference it was recognized that the Treaty of Locarno had died a natural death. Observing that his position was strong, Hitler thought that the League of Nations could provide a good public relations opportunity and a diplomatic sounding board and, taking advantage of the fact that he had been invited to attend, Hitler sent there German FM Joachim von Ribbentrop, who arrived March 19 and made the following declaration:

Chancellor Hitler formulated a whole series of proposals in favor of peace. They were not taken seriously.

__He proposed a general disarmament: that was rejected.

__He proposed a partial, equitable disarmament, based on armies of 200,000 men; that was rejected.

__He proposed an aerial pact: that was rejected. [27]

__On May 21, 1935 he proposed a combination of measures designed to ensure peace in Europe: they were rejected, except for the dispositions concerning naval disarmament, which served as a basis for the Anglo-German accord.

The Chancellor of Germany has reiterated many times his offers of peace and—permit me to say—he and all of Germany hoped that the Franco-Soviet Pact would not be ratified. When, ignoring his offers and warnings, the French Parliament ratified this Pact, the Reich’s Chancellor, conscious of his grave responsibilities toward the German people, came to the only possible conclusion. He reestablished German sovereignty over all the territory of the Reich.

In acting thus, the German government based itself on the following facts:

1. As a consequence of the unilateral action of France, the spirit and letter of the Pact of Locarno has been so radically distorted that said Pact has lost its force and effect.

2. As a consequence of the new military alliance concluded between France and the Soviet Union, Germany has been forced to put in practice, without delay, the elemental right of every nation to assure the security of its own territory.

For this reason the German government categorically rejects the charge of having unilaterally violated the Treaty of Locarno. It is materially impossible to violate an accord which the acts of another signatory have already rendered obsolete.

The content and scope of the German proposals require no explanation. They are so broad and comprehensive that any man motivated by a sincere love of Europe can only wish their rapid implementation. Hopefully, the Council of the League of Nations, guided by their deepest feelings and conscious of their historic significance, will recognize that they have in their hands the instrument with which it will be possible to banish the specter of war and steer an anxious Europe onto the path of peace. [28]

Von Ribbentrop’s logic seems irrefutable. And the proof thereof is that no one attempted to refute it. There was no discussion, in spite of the fact that the German plenipotentiary seemed, clearly, to await a response. There was none. All the Council members seemed embarrassed. [29] In their name the president of the assembly took note of Ribbentrop’s speech and adjourned the meeting.

That afternoon, in Ribbentrop’s absence, which, oddly, no one seemed to notice, [30] the Counsel confined itself to declaring, with no previous discussion and no commentary, that “Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty has been violated by Germany.” There was no talk of military intervention, or of reprisals or of any kind of action.

On adjourning the meeting, Bruce gave a short oration which contained the following phrase: “Chancellor Hitler has renewed his offers of cooperation: they have been confirmed to us this very morning by his personal representative. I am convinced, then, that a solution will be found.” This was, in fact a sort of note of approval given unexpectedly to Hitler by Bruce, an English conservative who was opposed to the war clan represented by the labor movement and the so-called young conservatives.

Some days later, on March 29, a referendum “approved the work carried out by the Fuehrer in the course of the past three years,” by 44,411,911 votes–that is, 99% of the voters, or the strongest majority one could ever get. The vast majority of the newspapers and magazines of the Western democracies, however, spoke of “rigged elections.”

They were forgetting that in the Saar region, under the control of the League of Nations, Hitler got no less than 90.75% of the votes, after 15 years of French propaganda.

It does not seem wildly unrealistic, then, to believe that without adverse propaganda and with the good work of Dr. Goebbels from the German Ministry of Propaganda, better results would be obtained: as much as, in this case, 99^%.

Hitler had won all down the line, but the war clan had succeeded, by means of the lavish use of its propagandistic resources on a world-wide scale, in making the Fuehrer appear in the eyes of an increasingly large portion of public opinion as a breaker of pacts and treaties—when, in the present case, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the treaty breaker was the French government, and not the German.

End notes:

22. Leon Blum and his nephew, Interior Minister Jules Moch (aka Moshe) were the champions of these mental acrobatics. (Author’s note)

23. Speech to the Reichstag May 21, 1935

24. Paris-Midi, Feb. 28, 1936

25. Jaques Galtier-Boissière: Histoire de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale.

26. Paul Rassinier: Les Responsables de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, pág. 109.

27. On March 31, 1936 Hitler proposed the prohibition of incendiary bombs and the bombardment of open cities. His proposal was rejected.

28. Journal of the League of Nations, March 27, 1935

29. Paul Rassinier: Les Responsables de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, pág. 112.

30. Archibald M. Ramsay: The Nameless War.