Joseph Stalin was certainly a devil, but a pretty shrewd devil who, thanks to the great European war that he had succeeded in provoking in 1939, was able to extend Soviet power enormously westward exactly according to his 1939 plan, enlarging the USSR and forcing Soviet domination on “East” Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
And after 1945 Stalin’s bloodthirty ideology also reached and prevailed in China, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba…. all this because, thanks to the Anglo-Americans, the Reich had lost its war against Bolshevism.
A renowned American historian has finally published the forbidden truth: it was Stalin who wanted war, but Hitler saved the western half of the white world from Bolshevik horrors
Author Sean McMeekin
McMeekin had the courage to write a book that is, let’s say, three-quarters accurate about NS Germany and the USSR — even if he does express himself quite timidly. This is remarkable for a former student of the arch-elitist, politically correct, NOM-subject American universities that are Stanford and Yale.
*** The 2021 book weighs in at almost 800 pages
It has been translated into Spanish (as “La guerra de Stalin”]
….as well as into German ( = “It was Stalin’s War”) (photo]
…. but never into French, which has over 600,000 jews, the biggest jewish population in western Europe apparently because the book does not sufficiently demonize the anti-Semitic Hitler….
***
Adolf Hitler is always presented as a real devil/tyrant/gas chamber-er, etc., but he was competing with a Joseph Stalin who was “just as evil” but supposedly smarter and more cunning than the Führer…..
[translated from a very anti-Hitler website — source: https://www.downpour.com/stalin-s-war?sp=426191]]
An award-winning historian reveals how Stalin, not Hitler, was the animating force of World War II in this major new history.
We remember World War II as a struggle between good and evil, with Hitler propelling events and the Allied powers saving the day. But Hitler’s armies did not fight in multiple theaters, his empire did not extend across the Eurasian continent, and he did not inherit the spoils of war.
This role belonged to Joseph Stalin. .
Hitler’s genocidal [sic] ambition may have sparked Armageddon, but as renowned historian Sean McMeekin shows, the conflicts that emerged were the result of Stalin’s maneuvers, orchestrated to spark a war between the capitalist powers in Europe and between Japan and Anglo-American forces in the Pacific.
Meanwhile, the doomed strategy of the United States and Britain of supporting Stalin and his armies at all costs 1941-45 allowed the Soviets to conquer most of Eurasia, from Berlin to Beijing, for communism.
A revolutionary reappraisal, Stalin’s War is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the roots of the current world order.
Editorial reviews [very complimentary!!]
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“Full of incisive character sketches and illuminating analyzes of military and diplomatic maneuvers.” —Weekly Editors
“A radical reassessment of the Second World War…A brilliantly counter-current story.” » —Kirkus Reviews
“Attractive, authoritative, accessible and always invigoratingly revisionist.” » —(((Simon Sebag Montefiore))) [the Montefiore’s are a super-wealthy Sephardic Jewish family], New York Times bestselling author
“McMeekin’s approach to Stalin’s War is both original and refreshing, written as it is with wonderful clarity.” —(((Antony Beevor))), New York Times bestselling author
“Sean McMeekin’s new book fills a huge gap in the historiography of the Second World War. Based on exhaustive research in Russian and other archives, his examination of Stalin’s foreign policy explores new avenues and explodes many myths. —Nikolai Tolstoy, author of Stalin’s Secret War
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…..Superb article found on Alain Soral’s “Equality and Reconciliation” site
Alain Soral, a former left-winger like fellow WN Hervé Ryssen, was recently sentenced in Switzerland to 40 days in prison under a so-called “anti-hate” law.
Soral, Ryssen, and the half-black comedian Dieudonné have all had to flee France, but now the Swiss are coming after Soralm, who is both a French and a Swiss citizen.
“We can’t wait to get them”
*** Translation:
“Gas Chambers for Dummies” [LOL]
With Alain Soral it’s always easy!
Volume 1: How to break a pane of glass in a wooden gas chamber door
Never again!
…Laurent Guyénot – Review of Sean McMeekin’s book, Stalin’s War
JdN: Guyénot is an engineer, a graduate of the Sorbonne (the Harvard of France), and the author of a superb analysis of the genocidal, psychopathic and malevolent Jewish religion. And as he explains, one must examine the words of Yahweh, and see the atrocious mentality of the divinity worshiped by the Jews, their satanic being, Yahweh.
Michelangelo, who was so famous and recognized as a genius that he could talk back to popes. He actually dared to present the great prophet of Yahweh, Moses, with two devil horns….
French author Laurent Guyénot [pronounced: GGee-aye-no]
From Yahweh to Zion – Laurent Guyénot
[source of this article by Alain Soral in French about McMeekin’s “Stalin’s War”: https://www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/Laurent-Guyenot-Recension-du-livre-de-Sean-McMeekin-Stalin-s-War-64364.html]
In a file published last year, I gave a detailed analysis of the two books by Victor Suvorov (pen name of Vladimir Rezun). These were: Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?, published in 1988, and: second, The Chief Culprit : Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II, published by a [major American] publisher specializing in military history (the Naval Institute Press), which really brought “the Suvorov hypothesis ” into academic debate.
Suvorov’s two main books:
- The Icebreaker (in English)
The Icebreaker (in French)
In German
And 2…. this Suvorov book is also important.
It is no exaggeration to say that the “Suvorov thesis” revolutionized the history of the Second World War, opening a completely new perspective to which many historians, both Russian and German, have now added supporting details: among the Germans, we can cite Joachim Hoffmann, Adolf von Thadden, Heinz Magenheimer, Werner Maser, Ernst Topitsch, Walter Post and Wolfgang Strauss, who reviewed Russian historians on the subject.
The debate is now taking a new turn with a book published in April by American historian Sean McMeekin: Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II.
An unassailable book in terms of the professionalism of the author, the sources, the bibliography, and the footnotes. It remains to now examine its thesis.
McMeekin covers the entirety of World War II, from political, strategic and military perspectives, focusing on the Eastern Front. Concerning the responsibilities for the war, and in particular its extension to the Eastern Front, does McMeekin corroborate Suvorov’s analysis, or does he invalidate it?
McMeekin’s main thesis is that World War II was primarily wanted and orchestrated by Stalin, while Hitler was drawn into it by Stalin’s intrigues.
This is precisely what Suvorov meant when he called Hitler “Stalin’s icebreaker” and titled his second book: The Principal Guilty Party.
Stalin’s grand design to start World War II. So I expected McMeekin’s book to cite Suvorov extensively and favorably. I was surprised to find that Suvorov was only mentioned once. After noting that Suvorov “found thousands of intriguing documents” in support of his thesis and that “dozens of Russian historians have studied Suvorov’s thesis”, producing in the process “two thick volumes” of additional documents, McMeekin concludes: “But considerable mystery remains surrounding Stalin’s intentionson the eve of the war”, and he adds that no clear written document can be produced which “unambiguously proves that Stalin had already resolved to war, whether preventive, defensive or otherwise.”
I have difficulty understanding this dismissive comment, because McMeekin actually agrees with almost every important point that Suvorov makes.
Like Suvorov, and drawing as he did on declassified Soviet archives, McMeekin shows that, despite his tactical claim to building “socialism in one country” [ = in the USSR], Stalin was unconditionally devoted to Lenin’s goal of the Sovietization of all of Europe. His analysis of how Stalin lured Hitler into a war on the Western Front with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is completely in agreement with what Suvorov says.
*** JdN The frosty Molotov-Hitler meeting in November 1940 in Berlin rightly convinced the Führer that Stalin wanted war with Germany at a time favorable for the Kremlin
***
McMeekin attributes the same meaning as Suvorov to Stalin’s announcement on May 5, 1941, according to which “we must move from defense to attack” (a speech to which McMeekin devotes his prologue). His interpretation of Stalin’s simultaneous self-designation as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars exactly echoes that of Suvorov: “From this moment on, all responsibility for Soviet foreign policy, for peace or war, for victory or defeat, rested solely in the hands of Stalin. The time for subterfuge was over. War was imminent. »
McMeekin takes up much of Suvorov’s evidence that Stalin’s war preparations were offensive and potentially overwhelming. He insists, like Suvorov, on the undefended air bases built near the border:
The most spectacular material evidence of more offensive Soviet intent was the construction of forward air bases abutting the new border separating Stalin’s empire from Hitler’s. The Soviet Main Airfield Construction Administration, headed by the NKVD, ordered the construction of 251 new Air Force bases in 1941, 80% (199) of which were located in western districts adjoining the German Reich.
The Soviet long-flight bomber Pe-81
In view of these elements, McMeekin estimates that “the ideal date for launching the Soviet offensive… fell at the end of July or during August [of 1941]. »
*** JdN: This accords with what I have been saying for years — that our preemptive attack of June 22, 1941 anticipated Stalin’s by about six weeks, though possibly even less.
***
McMeekin even reinforces Suvorov’s argument that Hitler’s mobilization on the Eastern Front was a reaction to Stalin’s war preparations, rather than the other way around, by showing that, as early as June 1940, the Germans were receiving intelligence reports according to which
“the Red Army, taking advantage of the concentration of the Wehrmacht in the West, was preparing to march from Lithuania towards East Prussia and with the part of Poland occupied by the Germans being practically defenseless. (…) On June 19, a German spy reported from Estonia that the Soviets had informed the British ambassador departing to Tallinn that Stalin planned to deploythree million soldiers into the Baltic region “to threaten the eastern borders of Germany”
McMeekin generally uses the same archives as Suvorov, but never gives him credit for being the first to bring them to light. The only exception is found in a single endnote, where he mentions that one of the reasons Stalin believed Hitler would not attack in June was that he had “learned, through spies in Germany, that the OKW had not ordered the sheepskin coats deemed essential for a winter campaign in Russia, and that the fuel and lubricating oil used by the Wehrmacht’s armored divisions would freeze in subzero temperatures “. The note states: “Not all of Suvorov’s claims hold water, but this one fits well with Stalin’s optimistic attitude toward reports of German arms accumulation. »
In another footnote, McMeekin disputes Suvorov’s assertion that Stalin ordered in the spring of 1941 the dismantling of the “Stalin Line” of defense which would hinder the advance of his troops: it was not dismantled but simply “neglected,” says McMeekin, before adding: “Here, as elsewhere, Suvorov harms his argument by overdoing it. » This criticism would be fair if McMeekin had also recognized the enormous amount of facts that Suvorov brought to light. For example, I myself believed that Suvorov was going a bit too far by claiming that almost a million paratroopers were ready for combat – and we know that paratroopers are only useful in an invasion war. But McMeekin confirms this figure, and even cites a major Pravda article making this same assertion.
Apparently, McMeekin thought it tactically wise not only to snub Suvorov even when he agreed with him, but also to insert this formal praise of his most vocal adversary, [JdN the jew] David Glantz (who, McMeekin writes, had ” reason to emphasize the extent to which the Red Army was in reality ill-prepared for war”), even when he proves Glantz wrong on almost all counts, by demonstrating that in June 1941, the stakes of the war “would be determined by whoever would strike first, taking control of enemy airspace and destroying airfields and tank parks.”
It is not difficult to guess the motive for McMeekin’s ostentatious contempt for Suvorov. Suvorov crossed the line by suggesting that Barbarossa saved Europe from complete Sovietization. Although he expressed no sympathy for Hitler, Suvorov agreed with him that if he had not attacked first, “Europe would have been lost.”
But thereby Suvorov committed an unforgivable sin. The untouchable cornerstone of Western and Russian historiography is that Hitler is the embodiment of absolute evil and that no good can come from him.
So academic historians of the Eastern Front are expected to show good manners by avoiding Suvorov and not asking questions like, “What if Hitler hadn’t attacked first?” » They must not suggest that Hitler ever told the truth, or that his military commanders were wrongly hanged on charges of crimes against peace because of Operation Barbarossa.
If the price of defending Suvorov’s revisionism in academic debate is to deny its debt to Suvorov, so be it. Historians of the Second World War have to be smart: a careless phrase or reference can cost you a career and a reputation, as happened to David Irving (photo — who is not even included in McMeekin’s bibliography).
It is best to leave it to others to draw some obvious conclusions. There is no doubt that McMeekin’s book is a great success, and it is to be hoped that it will become a necessary reference in the historiography of the Second World War. It is already the subject of much praise in the press and gives a good reputation to “revisionism”.
There are, of course, nuances between McMeekin’s and Suvorov’s perspectives. Rather than insisting that Barbarossa ruined Stalin’s plan for the conquest of Germany and Europe, McMeekin emphasizes that Barbarossa was for Stalin “a kind of public relations miracle” that transformed his status from “mass murderer and swallower of small nations”… to a ‘victim’ in the eyes of a large part of the Western public”.
*** Jdn. AH yes, and Frank Rosenfeld’s press minions spoke of the Red Army as “the gallant Russians” while Ilya Ehrenberg urged the soldiers on Soviet Radio to rape German women
In French:
in German:
in Russian:
In Danish:
In Italian:
In Spanish:
In Portuguese:
***
Stalin himself, in his broadcast speech on July 3, 1941, said that German “aggression” had brought “enormous political gain to the USSR”, creating support in London and Washington which was “a serious and lasting factor which can only form the basis for the development of decisive military successes of the Red Army.” That’s a good point.
From what we know of the secret intrigues of Churchill and Roosevelt before Barbarossa [on June 22, 1941], it is doubtful whether Stalin would have been deprived of their support if he had attacked first. Churchill had been urging him to attack Germany since 1940, and Roosevelt had begun planning his aid program for the USSR just after his second re-election in November 1940, when he told Americans that their country must become “the great arsenal of democracy” and named the pro-Soviet Harry Hopkins [who had a relationship from 1931-45, to his death, with the jewess Ethel Gross] to begin making arrangements.
In Teheran/Iran in 1943, from l-to-r, US General George Marshall, Harry Hopkins, interpreter, Stalin (jewish wife), FM Molotov (jewish wife) und General Voroshilov
In fact, McMeekin shows that “Roosevelt did everything he could to improve relations with Stalin” from the first years of his long presidency, beginning with the official recognition of the USSR in 1933. He purged the department state of anti-communists and stuffed it with sympathizers or outright agents of the NKVD, like Alger Hiss.
In November 1936, he appointed a Soviet sympathizer, Joseph Davies, as ambassador to Moscow, replacing William Bullitt who had been too openly critical of Stalin. “Where Ambassador Bullitt had seen deception and cunning in Stalin’s foreign policy, his successor saw unicorns,” and Davies showered the tyrant with compliments: “You are a greater leader than Catherine the Great, than Peter the Great, a greater leader even than Lenin,’ etc….”
So, even if Barbarossa made it easier for Roosevelt to turn American public opinion in favor of Stalin, that does not mean that Roosevelt would have stopped Stalin from engulfing Europe if Stalin had attacked first.
Stalin’s plan for the conquest of Europe
Like Suvorov, McMeekin provides compelling evidence that Stalin planned to invade Europe in 1941, and had been planning it for a very long time. Like Suvorov, he emphasizes that the Comintern, founded in Moscow in 1919, explicitly aimed at the Sovietization of the entire world.
Lenin’s primary objective was Berlin. To do this, he wanted to blow up Poland, a country reconstituted after the First World War from parts of Russia and Germany. But after the failed attempted invasion of Poland in the summer of 1920, Lenin proclaimed a new strategy at a party congress in Moscow on November 26, 1920: “Until the final victory of socialism in the world, we must exploit the contradictions and oppositions between two groups of imperialist powers, between two groups of capitalist states, and incite them to attack each other. »
The failure of the communist uprising in Germany in October 1923 [a month before Hitler’s Beer Hall putsch] also proved that revolutionary agitation was not enough.
*** JdN: Contrary to their expectations, the German communists found no support among workers for the overthrow of the state in October 1923, even though the economic situation was horrible, and the same was true for Hitler with his failed putsch in Munich in November.
a communist leaflet on the resistance and left-wing coalitions in Thuringia and Saxony had little effect
***
What had to be done was to help create the conditions for a new world war and, during this incubation period, to put a damper on the internationalist discourse in order to maintain commercial relations with the capitalist countries (which would eventually “sell the communists the rope that they will use to hang them”).
McMeekin agrees with Suvorov that Stalin was the true heir of Lenin, whose public cult he orchestrated: “Stalin’s dialectical vision of Soviet foreign policy – in which metastasizing conflict between warring capitalist factions would allow communism to advance towards new triumphs – was firmly rooted in Marxism-Leninism, based on the precedent of Russia’s own experience in the First World War. And this was clearly and consistently stated on numerous occasions, both verbally and in writing. »
In his first major work after Lenin’s death, Foundations of Leninism (1924), Stalin recalled that the Bolshevik revolution had triumphed in Russia because the two main coalitions of capitalist countries “grabbed each other by the throat”. “When a new capitalist war breaks out,” Stalin declared to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1925, “we will have to act, but we will be the last ones to do so. And we will do it in order to throw our own decisive weight on the scales, the weight that can tip these scales.”
While preparing for World War II, Stalin’s domestic policy was, on the one hand, to consolidate his control over the population and, on the other, to build a huge military-industrial complex. “Stalin’s industrialization campaign,” writes McMeekin, “was conceived, sold and executed as a military operation aimed at the capitalist world. (…) Every time onerous production targets were not achieved, capitalist saboteurs were blamed, as if they had been spies in an army camp.»
*** Sabotage by foot-dragging was a real problem in Germany
***
Since the inauguration of the first “Five-Year Plan” in 1928, the Soviet economy was on a war footing. The production targets of the Third Five Year Plan, launched in 1938, were staggering, calling for the production of 50,000 warplanes per year by the end of 1942, along with 125,000 aircraft engines and 700,000 tons of aerial bombs. ; 60,775 tanks, 119,060 artillery systems, 450,000 machine guns and 5.2 million rifles; 489 million artillery shells, 120,000 tons of naval armor and 1 million tons of explosives; and, for good measure, 298,000 tons of chemical weapons.
In 1939, all Stalin needed was to push the capitalist countries into another deadly war. This is the main objective, from Stalin’s point of view, of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact signed on August 23, 1939, with a secret protocol for the partition of Poland and the distribution of “spheres of influence”.
The Gangsters’ Pact
The Reich FM von Ribbentrop, Stalin and Soviet FM Molotov
Two months earlier, Stalin was still negotiating, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov and his ambassador in London Maiski, the possibility of a military alliance with England and France in order to contain Germany and protect the integrity of Poland. On June 2, 1939, Molotov presented the British and French ambassadors with a draft agreement, under which the Soviets could provide mutual assistance to small European states under the “threat of aggression by a European power.” On August 12, an Anglo-French delegation arrived in Moscow to continue discussions. But Stalin then changed his mind and Molotov did not receive the delegates. In a speech to the Politburo on August 19, 1939, Stalin explained why he ultimately opted for a pact with Germany:
The question of war or peace has entered a critical phase for us. If we conclude a mutual assistance pact with France and Britain, Germany will withdraw from Poland and seek a modus vivendi with the Western powers. War would be avoided, but events could become dangerous for the USSR. If we accept Germany’s proposal and conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will of course invade Poland, and the intervention of France and England would then be inevitable. Western Europe would be subject to serious upheaval and disorder. In this case, we will have a great opportunity to stay out of the conflict, and we could plan the opportune moment to go to war. (…)
Our choice is clear. We must accept the German proposal and, by refusal, politely send the Anglo-French mission home. Our immediate advantage will be to take Poland up to the gates of Warsaw, as well as Ukrainian Galicia…
For the realization of these plans it is essential that the war continue as long as possible, and all forces, with which we are actively involved, must be directed towards this goal…
Therefore, our goal is for Germany to fight the war as long as possible, so that England and France become tired and exhausted to such an extent that they are no longer able to defeat a Sovietized Germany.
Comrades! It is in the interests of the USSR – the homeland of the workers – for war to break out between the Reich and the Anglo-French capitalist bloc. Everything must be done to ensure that it continues as long as possible with the aim of weakening both parties. For this reason, it is imperative that we agree to conclude the pact proposed by Germany, and that we then work so that this war, once declared, is prolonged as much as possible. We must strengthen our propaganda work in the belligerent countries, in order to be ready when the war is over.
This speech was leaked to the French news agency Havas the same year. Stalin immediately denounced it as a forgery in Pravda, which was exceptional on his part. Its authenticity has long been debated, but in 1994 Russian historians found an authoritative transcription of it in Soviet archives, and its authenticity is now generally accepted.
In any case, other sources confirm Stalin’s stratagem, so that there is no doubt, for McMeekin, that with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, “far from wanting to prevent a European war between the Germany and the Western powers, Stalin’s goal was to ensure that it broke out. »
For Stalin, “the advantages of the Moscow Pact for communism were obvious. The capitalist world would soon be embroiled in a terrible war, and the USSR would be able to expand its territory substantially westward against seemingly defenseless enemies
[JdN: the Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe represented the correctness of his plan].
***JdN
The yellow lines show the westward expansion of communism from 1945. In the cases of Yugoslavia and Finland, they ceased belonging to the west and became neutral — two more successes for Stalin. (Albania, on the other hand, left the Warsaw Pact in 1961.)
***
All Stalin had to do was ensure that neither Germany nor its adversaries gained a decisive advantage. Once both sides had exhausted themselves in a struggle to the death, the way would be clear for the armies of communism to swoop in and take the capitalist world by the throat. »
But how could Stalin be so sure that France and England would not declare war on Russia as well? Part of the answer is that he did not break off negotiations with Britain after signing a pact with Hitler. It is even believed that on October 15, 1939, less than two months after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, a secret Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed behind Hitler’s back.
With the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Hitler believed he had countered the British policy of encirclement against Germany. And he believed the pact would protect him from a declaration of war by Britain and France if Germany and Russia intervened in Poland. He had greatly underestimated Stalin.
When Hitler invaded Poland from the west on September 1, the Red Army did not move. On September 3, England and France declared war on Germany alone. It was an unpleasant surprise for Hitler. He urged the Russians to launch their attack, but they turned a deaf ear. “On September 3,” McMeekin writes, “Ribbentrop sent a telegram to Ambassador Schulenburg in Moscow, asking him to ask Molotov whether the USSR would participate in the Polish War as promised and provide ‘relief’ to the pressured Wehrmacht. Didn’t Stalin, Ribbentrop asked, consider it desirable for Russian forces to act at the appropriate time against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, occupy that territory? »
Molotov replied on September 5: “The time has not yet come. It seems to us that by excessive haste we could harm our cause and promote the unity of our adversaries.”
On September 8, a new communiqué from the Wehrmacht urged the Soviets to advance as Warsaw was taken. The Soviets responded that the fall of Warsaw was not confirmed and that “Russia being linked to Poland by a non-aggression pact, it cannot move forward”.
On September 10, Molotov bluntly declared to Schulenburg that, “to keep up appearances, we should not cross the border of Poland before the capital has fallen” and that the pretext for the Soviet entry into Poland would be to protect “Ukrainians and Belarusians in danger”. Stalin even tried to persuade the Polish government, which had taken refuge in Kúty, to ask him for protection.
Finally, on September 17, the Polish ambassador in Moscow was summoned at 3 a.m. and was given the following message:
The German-Polish War showed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish state. During ten days of hostilities, Poland lost all its industrial zones and cultural centers. Warsaw, the capital of Poland, no longer exists. The Polish government has disintegrated and no longer shows any signs of life. This means that the Polish state and its government have, in fact, ceased to exist. Likewise, the agreements concluded between the USSR and Poland ceased to function.
Left to its own devices and deprived of direction, Poland has become a breeding ground for all kinds of dangers and surprises, which can pose a threat to the USSR. For these reasons, the Soviet government, which has been neutral until now, can no longer maintain a neutral attitude towards these facts. Nor can the Soviet government regard with indifference the fact that the Ukrainian and White Russian people, who live on Polish territory and who are at the mercy of fate, are left defenseless.
Under these circumstances, the Soviet government ordered the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the border and take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and the Western White Russia. At the same time, the Soviet Government intends to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from the unhappy war into which they have been drawn by their reckless leaders.
Although it does not explicitly mention Germany as the aggressor, the message is clear: the USSR is not the aggressor, but the defender.
The Soviets had waited two and a half weeks before entering Poland, leaving all the fighting to the Germans and giving the world the impression that they were intervening to prevent Germany from taking over the entire country. The USSR therefore remains officially neutral and incurs no reproaches from France and England.
Hitler tries to regain the advantage
Although the partition of Poland was Stalin’s idea, only Hitler was blamed for it. His Faustian pact with his worst enemy had not protected him from war with France and England, nor would it protect him from a Soviet invasion. It is clear that he was duped. By inciting Hitler to invade Poland, Stalin started World War II while remaining on the sidelines. All he had to do was wait for the countries of Europe to exhaust each other in a new war.
On September 1, the same day as Germany invaded Poland, the Supreme Soviet adopted a general conscription law which, under the guise of establishing a two-year military service, was equivalent to a general mobilization. This is proof that Stalin knew that the partition of Poland would trigger world war, instead of avoiding it as Hitler hoped.
Meanwhile, Stalin took full advantage of Germany’s difficulties in the West, seizing three Baltic states bordering Germany and peppering them with military bases.
As McMeekin notes:
By taking opportunistic measures against the Baltic States, Bessarabia and northern Bukovina following Germany’s humiliation of France, Stalin was making the most of his romantic partnership with Hitler while escaping, from a one way or another, from the hostility of Hitler’s adversaries.
Britain, in what Churchill called the country’s “finest hour”, now stood alone against Nazi Germany. However, Britain did not declare war on alliance partner Berlin, although Stalin had invaded the same number of sovereign countries since August 1939 as Hitler (seven).
But there were limits to Hitler’s patience, and Stalin was about to reach them.
Like Suvorov before him, McMeekin highlights the hypocrisy of the British. “The number of victims murdered by the Soviet authorities in occupied Poland in June 1941 – around five hundred thousand – was even three or four times higher than the number of those killed by the Nazis. »
Yet Stalin did not even receive a slap on the wrist from the Western powers. Foreign Secretary Halifax explained to the British War Cabinet on September 17, 1939 that “Great Britain was not bound by the treaty [with Poland] to engage in war with the U.S.S.R. following its invasion of Poland”, because the Anglo-Polish agreement “provided that Her Majesty’s Government would only act if Poland suffered aggression from a European Power”, and Russia was not a “European power.”
*** Ridiculous! Russia is not a European country?
The Michailovski Palace in Saint Petersburg
These are not Europeans by race, language and culture?
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At a meeting of the war cabinet on November 16, 1939, Churchill even approved Stalinist aggression: “No doubt it seemed reasonable to the Soviet Union to take advantage of the current situation to reconquer part of the territory which Russia had lost as a result of the last war, at the beginning of which it had been the ally of France and Great Britain. »
McMeekin comments: “The fact that Hitler used the same justification for Germany’s territorial claims to Poland did not occur to Churchill or bother him. »
Stalin hoped that Germany would fight against France and England for two or three years before he intervened. He therefore continued to supply Germany with raw materials, and was careful not to cut off its supply of metals from Sweden, and of oil from Romania, although he had the means to do so.
When the Germans launched their offensive against France on May 10, 1940, Stalin rejoiced. “Finally, the Communists could rejoice in seeing “two groups of capitalist countries… putting up a good, hard fight and weakening each other,” as Stalin had boasted to Comintern General Secretary Dimitrov in September 1939. »
But the war turned out to be less bloody than he had expected.
The speed of German victories, however, was alarming.
Stalin and Molotov would have preferred a slow, bloody battle of attrition – a German victory, yes, but one that would have weakened Hitler almost as much as his enemies. According to Khrushchev’s later recollections, upon learning of the extent of the Allies’ debacle later in May, Stalin “cursed the French and British, asking how they could have let Hitler crush them like that.”
Germany’s military successes forced Stalin to rush his preparations to put the Red Army on the starting blocks in the summer of 1941. In the spring, the armament, troops and transports were ready, and preparations began. their final phase. On May 5, 1941, Stalin told military officers that the “Soviet peace policy” (i.e., the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) had allowed the USSR to “advance to the west and north, increasing thus its population by thirteen million people,” but that the days of such conquest “had come to an end. We can no longer gain a single foot of ground with such peaceful sentiments.”
Anyone who “did not recognize the necessity of offensive action was a bourgeois and an imbecile”; “Today, now that our army has been completely rebuilt, fully equipped to fight modern warfare, now that we are strong – now we must move from defense to attack.” To do this, we must “transform our training, our propaganda, our agitation, the imprint of an offensive mentality on our mind”.
By then, Hitler must have realized that he was trapped. He may have remembered what he had written in 1925: “The formation of a new alliance with Russia would lead to a new war and the result would be the end of Germany” (Mein Kampf, vol. 2, chapter 14).
With Operation Barbarossa, he tried to regain the advantage. But, according to Suvorov, it was impossible for Germany alone to defeat Russia, for reasons linked to the immensity of its territory, the harshness of the winter and the limited resources of Germany compared to those of Russia.
It can be argued that Hitler could have prevailed and conquered the Lebensraum of his dreams if Stalin had not been saved by Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease aid: more than ten billion – the equivalent of trillions today today – of planes and tanks, locomotives and rails, construction materials, entire assembly lines for military production, food and clothing, aviation fuel and much more.
Over the course of four dense chapters, McMeekin strives to show (like Albert Weeks before him in Russia’s Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. in World War II, 2010), that without aid from the United States, the Soviet Union probably could not have repelled the Germans, much less conquered Eastern Europe in 1945.
Another factor that McMeekin emphasizes—and is certainly less disputed—was Stalin’s almost unlimited supply of cannon fodder: a total of 32 million troops throughout the war, led to slaughter with machine guns in their backs and the threat that, if they were captured rather than killed, their families would be punished: “The USSR under Stalin is the only state in known history to have declared the captivity of its soldiers a capital crime” .
Ultimately, while Stalin entered the war on the side of Germany, it will exit on the side of the Allies. While England and France officially went to war to defend Poland’s territorial integrity, by the end of the war all of Poland would be under Stalin’s rule.
While the pact deciding the partition of Poland between Germany and Russia was signed in Moscow – in the presence of Stalin and not Hitler – history will only remember Germany’s aggression, and will consider the USSR as one of the attacked countries.
But a revisionist tendency is now asserting itself on this subject, and is consolidated with excellent books like that of McMeekin.
— Laurent Guyénot
McMeekin’s main thesis is that World War II was primarily wanted and orchestrated by Stalin, while Hitler was drawn into it by Stalin’s intrigues.
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[END OF GUYÉNOT’S ARTICLE IN ER].
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As the honest Suvorov said, and like McMeekin, it is probably thanks to Operation Barbarossa that the Soviet troops failed to raise the red flag over Paris, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Rome, Stockholm and perhaps even London.
And Hitler was not a “madman” who deliberately started a super-bloody world war with the ambition of “conquering the world”. The evildoer who wanted and provoked this terrible war was Stalin.
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A comment under the German version of this article:
MAY 2, 2024 AT 5:14 AM
“The USSR under Stalin is the only state in known history to have declared the captivity of its soldiers a capital crime”. That’s true. Red Army men were expected to fight to the death. Stalin considered them traitors if they didn’t. Hitler offered to treat captured Soviet soldiers according to the Geneva Convention if the same would be done for German prisoners even though the USSR hadn’t signed it. Stalin refused this humanitarian gesture as he didn’t want to offer any assistance to men he considered traitors.
Article by Russian author Yuri Teplyakov
Yeah, Churchhill wanted war as well and got rich serving his jew masters, before ww2 he was completley broke.
After ww2 he retired a very weathy man, he’s mothers real name was Jenny Jacobson.
He was half Jewish so no wonder he was a greedy war mongering scumbag, and Roosavelt was Jewish and was surrounded by jews and financed by them.
Stalin was a peasant from Georgia, and i heard that he had a small bit of jewish ancestory.
Just because he didn’t trust his jewish associates it does not mean he didn’t have some Jewish heritage.
I’ve heard that he was just a puppet of Lazar Kaganovich who was the one really pulling the strings.
Who died of old age in 1991, a few months before the fall of the Berlin wall.
Do you think that theory has any truth to it, or was Stalin the one making all the decisions.
Regardless Stalin was brought to power by Kaganovich, and funded by the Rothchilds.
Stalin was a fanatic communist, a true believer, and it was he who used the jews….. He knew he could get jews to eagerly kill Russians,. and vice versa.
Stalin resurrected Russian national pride in order to 1) win WWII and 2) to resist the jews in the Communist Party and government.
His policies of 1) jews never being promoted to being the boss of anything, being at most the number-two, the vice-director, and 2) armed support for the Arabs against Israel stayed in force long after his death in 1953 — to the very end of the Soviet Union in 1991.
I know that a lot of people view numerology as a pseudo-science, but as someone who has studied it, I genuinely feel that it can be used to explain some of the more confusing details about Hitler & his enemies.
Hitler was a 5 Lifepath (JcN is also a 5 Personality Number, per his biography, and it’s common for one’s current Personality Number to have been their previous Lifepath…). Hitler was also born on the 20th and 20 is a ‘hidden 11.’
5 men are typically entertaining, energetic, determined, and travelers / adventurers. 11s are often charismatic, emotional, capable of relating to people of both sexes, and have ‘old soul’ energy.
Alternatively, we know that Hitler was born sometime in the evening. If he was actually born early on the 21st (very possible) that would make him a Master Number 33 Lifepath and 3 Personality Number. This is the combination of an extremely communicative person.
Either way, Hitler’s numerology is that of someone who was born to speak, entertain, or motivate. Neither combination is meant to be too focused on military affairs. Hitler would have done his best motivating and energizing others to handle those things. Hitler probably never wanted to be a warlord and, in his heart, wanted to be remembered for his post war architecture plans. He probably didn’t have a lot of patience for old souls who made stupid decisions but would have been patient with young souls.
Knowing Hitler’s numbers, it’s important to look at Stalin’s. He was born on the 18th of December 1878 and was a 9 Personality Number and 9 Lifepath.
The world’s most famous living numerologist, ‘GG33,’ has said that “most 9s are shitty people” and a double 9 is even more problematic. He doesn’t allow 9s into his core numerology program without extreme vetting and has said that this rule applies no matter how much money is offered.
9s are often rebellious, masters of mimicry, psychic, and prone to lies. They can be good people, but many struggle with narcissism and they often join Leftist movements. Stalin did well in the Communist party because his energy fit perfectly with it. He was surrounded by energy that resonated with his own.
9s also tend to instinctively hate master numbers (11, 22, 33) and try to use subversive means to destroy them. Stalin probably wanted to take out / use Hitler for years.
FDR and Churchill were both 3 Personality Numbers (communicators). FDR was a 5 Lifepath but couldn’t walk (for a 5 Lifepath, a number connected to adventure and movement, I believe an issue with legs means bad karma). Churchill was a 7 Lifepath, which is the number of mental giftedness.
Alfred Rosenberg and Goering were also 3 Personality Numbers and 7 Lifepaths (the same combination as Churchill).
7s are intuitive, see through lies, and are good at dealing with 9s.
It’s a historical fact that Rosenberg and Goering both resisted the formation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. They were loyal to Hitler and this was one of the biggest disagreements they had with him. They likely sensed Stalin’s subversiveness and would have wanted to avoid his trap. It’s also important to remember that Churchill, also a 7 Lifepath, referred to Stalin in derogatory terms whereas FDR loved ‘Uncle Joe.’ It’s due to energy. 7s see through 9s whereas 5s often don’t or think they can ‘handle them.’
Hitler, as a partial 11 or a 33, would have wanted to see a genuine rapprochement. Hitler’s numerology is not that of a warlord, he would have wanted to ‘cut a deal’ and finish the war in the west so he could focus on his social and economic programs before finishing off the USSR. Ribbentrop, who helped enact the Pact, was a 1 Lifepath. 1s are aggressive and ambitious, but tend to get taken advantage of by 9s (who use indirect tactics). Ribbentrop was the worst possible man, numerologically speaking, to negotiate with Stalin.
There’s more I could say, but the basic gist of it is that Hitler’s numerology (either version) is that of someone whose greatest skill was motivating people. Stalin’s numerology is that of a true-believing Communist who would have used subversive means to organize against Hitler and coopt his work. Stalin also may have had some psychic / intuitive abilities but likely never bragged about them.
Finally, 9s can be like an ‘intelligent child.’ 7 is the number of genius and, due to this, it knows how to out-think a ‘bad kid.’ 33s and 11s are also very intelligent, but they love children and are teachers. They want to believe that a bad 9 has ‘seen the light’ so to speak. 11s also tend to empathize with others and will want to assume 9s will change.
The easiest way, numerologically speaking, to deal with Stalin would have been bribery and flattery. 7s will do that, but it’s extremely hard for someone with 11 or 33 energy to do that to someone who they know is less spiritually evolved than them. Master Numbers aren’t inhuman or better than others, they’re just here to teach. And a lot of 9s are either New Age psychic types or they’re intelligent yet delinquent souls that keep going round & round without learning anything.
Thank you; interesting.
Adolf Hitler’s Maya-Astrology for April 20, 1889 in Braunau
Mayan astrology did not use a zodiac similar to that in the west. It was based on a combination of Sun and Moon calendars complemented by numerology.
MANIK, the Blue Hand
[manik]
knowledge, realization, healing
Direction: West
Element: Water
Chakra: Heart
Your birth with MANIK, the Blue Hand, promises an active and intense life. Thirst for action, curiosity and a thirst for knowledge are your companions who make you experiment and sociable. Your antennae are always extended and you want to take in everything. Your actions are result-oriented and purposeful. As a Blue Hand, you don’t just want to talk about it, you also want to do it, realize it, and deliver an end result.
You know that true knowledge comes only through experience. And it is precisely the active implementation that is the key for you to learn. Pay attention to the feedback that occurs during your work and align your projects with the benefit of everyone involved – that is, for you or not just for you – so you will achieve something great.
You will then become a salutary blessing for your environment. The healing effect occurs because those involved find meaning for their work in your project. The key to this salvation is to focus one’s activity on the well-being of all.
MANIK-born are leaders. They want to take people by the hand and lead their environment, implement their project of salvation.
Shadow
The great power of implementation of MANIK becomes problematic if the motives do not come from the heart and these are either too much geared towards one’s own interests or too much towards the interests of others. In both cases it leads to disaster and becomes destructive, either for the initiator or for those involved in a project or for both. You can find pre-indications for a misalignment of your actions in the form of great restlessness and work addiction.
Everyone who has chosen CABAN, IK and EB also has access to the MANIK energies.
VAXAC, Galactic Tone 8
unity, harmonize, shape
The Galactic Tone 8, VAXAC, offers you the best possibilities to realize. You feel that you want to make a difference and you are an active person. You have the ability to find a common denominator and can thus connect people and projects. Last but not least, your sensitive ability to perceive supports you. Once you have established unity, you can influence and lead in a targeted manner. In this way you can implement and design your goals with maximum effectiveness.
Shadow pattern
The great power of realization harbors the danger that you can also cause a lot of harm if you choose your goals only selfishly and are not in balance yourself. You then have to spoon out a correspondingly large pot of unloved soup on your own. Your appearance could take on reckless and dictatorial traits because success becomes your most important goal. However, your goals should definitely also serve the larger whole.
***
I have interpreted this negative material as being fulfilled by the catastrophic invasion of Russia to conquer and enslave it. Up until June 22, 1941 everything we did worked out splendidly. After that date, nothing. And no amount of German genius and bravery could stop three superpowers under jew influence (the US, UK, and USSR) from beating the one that was jew-free, the Third Reich.
https://johndenugent.com/hitler-germany/hitlers-great-mistake-in-russia/
Very fascinating! To be honest, I haven’t studied Mayan astrology so I can’t say too much about it. My research has mainly been on how to use a combination of Numerology, Western Astrology, and the Chinese Zodiac. I’ve found that Numerology tends to give more specific information than Astrology (every number has strengths & weaknesses, and every number combination reacts differently to other combinations).
I agree that the way Barbarossa was carried out wasn’t ideal. I honestly also think the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact wasn’t the best idea in the first place.
For what it’s worth, 5 + 11 combinations (like Hitler) often try to do too much in a short time. They often end up entranced by a vision of a better future and worry that no one else will have the ability to make it a reality. This can be a vision for a country, company, family, etc. They also sometimes end up over reliant on their own intuition vs that of others (11 is the Master Intuitive / Master Psychic / Master Visionary… Hitler saying that he went for walks and listened to his inner voice is exactly what I’d expect).
The most intuitive numbers are:
1. 11
2. 7
3. 9
11s are normally more intuitive than the other two because their powers are more broad. They’re amazing at sensing the intentions of most others, relating to animals, sensing bad energy in a building, etc. However, if they have cognitive dissonance about what they’re doing their emotional nature means it will be hard to connect to their intuition / vision. It was probably harder for Hitler to hear his ‘inner voice’ after he launched Barbarossa because some part of him knew it wasn’t going to end well. Hitler’s mission wasn’t to conquer others, it was to get the Germans back on their feet. The farther he strayed from that, the more emotional turmoil he would have felt. He was probably happiest in the early 30s when speaking to the masses and getting them reemployed.
7s are normally well meaning oldish souls, but they have weaknesses too (a lot of the time they come across as eccentric… Rosenberg writing about Atlantis and Goering’s costumes are pretty standard 7 behaviors).
9s are intuitive too but in a different way. They have a connection to Vision, Mirroring, and Sight. Their weakness is Ego and its easy to manipulate them using it.
Hitler’s best friend, numerologically, would have been Dietrich Eckhart (a 5 Personality Number, similar to Hitler’s 5 Lifepath, but a 4 Lifepath… 4 is the Builder and loves to give resources to 11s, they see the potential in 11s). Eckhart’s support for Hitler is exactly what I’d expect. There was likely deep mutual respect.
Hitler also probably had a different relationship with Speer than was implied post war. Speer was born on the 19th (a Karmic Debt number relating to being controlling or manipulative in a previous life, often 19s want to grow / change but it’s hard) and was a Double 1. Every good numerologist knows 1s tend to be dazzled with 11s.
It’s likely that Speer was dazzled by Hitler’s ability to visualize & Hitler saw the potential for growth in Speer. 11s like to help 1s grow.
From the perspective of Numerology, Hitler should have relied more on advice from those around him when dealing with Stalin and, when dealing with the West, the easiest way to beat Churchill would have been with bribery or using an 8 Lifepath to negotiate.
7s don’t tend to fall for flattery (like a 9) but they often struggle with money. Churchill was bankrupt half of his life. Expensive gifts would have shut him up. Alternatively, 7s tend to get dazzled by 8s (8 is the number of money).
Thanks.
Well, Lord Rothschild was right in London to monitor his minion and could always easily outbribe us. 😉
Also,Churchill was very likely a bisexual and a pedophile. Even tbe Daily Mail had a big and shocking article based on the reports.
https://johndenugent.com/norman-descendant-richard-spencer-wants-to-give-pedophiles-child-porn-normans-nordic-sell-outs-like-churchill-winnie-a-closet-gay/
And I think he was deep into satanism. …not just money and top-shelf booze.
https://www.instagram.com/reel/C67FvCFK2KLswQ_gIij92_FoRc69tHFuzZ43Ks0/?igsh=MXM0eGJvOGx2c2IyYQ==